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Abstract 
It is striking that there is little or no mention in the TTIP debate so far of the US-EU Mutual Recognition 
Agreement (MRA) concluded in 1998. At the time, expectations of the gains from the MRA were high.  
One should expect the MRA to be instructive for TTIP and entail some lessons to be learned for today’s 
attempt to lower technical barriers to trade (TBTs) across the North Atlantic. We offer an analysis of the 
1998 MRA, the difficulties in the prior negotiations and those during the implementation phase, the 
subsequent and present status of sectoral approaches. The MRA experience revealed clearly how 
difficult it is to accomplish the acceptance of all relevant aspects of conformity assessment of the trading 
partner for the mere purpose of testing and certifying export goods on the requirements of the importing 
economy. The MRA has succeeded only in a few sectors. However, the ambition in TTIP with respect 
to TBTs is said to go so much further. It is therefore important for all those involved or interested in 
TTIP to learn the lessons of this early exercise in lowering TBT costs.   
This paper reaches two main conclusions: i) the US-EU MRA was only partially successful and only for 
some one-fifth of the export flows at the time: a disappointing outcome and a far cry from the 
expectations of business and political leaders; and ii) the EU’s attempt to ‘balance’ the negotiations in 
1995 by bringing in three relatively competitive sectors did not work out – it was precisely there that 
problems accumulated. It is critical that domestic regulators must be satisfied during and after the 
negotiations that their pursuit of health, safety, environment and consumer protection objectives will 
not be watered down in any way. 
Some lessons for TTIP  
Lessons drawn include, among others:  
(a) MRAs are not about regulatory change (by definition), but if initial regulatory cleavages 
between trading partners are too wide, conditions become so restrictive that parties may regard 
them as a denial of the very purpose of the MRA.  
(b) There are incentives to opt for alternatives in the market for the formalised designation of 
conformity assessment bodies in the MRA and these are often cheaper and faster, while equally 
qualified.  
(c) Even in heavily regulated sectors such as medicines and medical devices, the narrow MRA has 
been superseded by near-global forms of effective cost-reducing cooperative (i.e. not treaty-
based) regulatory alignment, a confirmation of the OECD approach that governments should 
think in terms of an entire spectrum of forms of regulatory cooperation.  
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Jacques Pelkmans and Anabela Correia de Brito* 
CEPS Special Report No. 101 / March 2015 
1. Introduction and purpose  
The ongoing negotiations between the European Union and the United States to create a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are largely about reducing regulatory 
barriers, especially technical barriers in goods markets. It is hoped to be accomplished by a 
broad range of instruments of regulatory cooperation, both within sectors and horizontally. 
This is often presented as breaking new ground and achieving appreciable economic gains in 
some sectors. It is also held to be an example for the world in that advanced regulatory 
cooperation to accomplish major reductions in TBTs (technical barriers to trade) will be agreed 
for the first time outside deep common markets. However, both of these assertions are 
incorrect. It seems to have been forgotten that, some 20 years ago, the US and the EU were 
negotiating a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) in order to lower the costs of TBTs 
hindering transatlantic market access in six industrial sectors. It is striking that, in the TTIP 
debate so far, there is little or no mention of the US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) 
concluded in 1998.1 At the time, expectations of the gains from the MRA were high in business 
and in trade policy circles. Both business in the TABD2 and government negotiators (e.g. in 
the EU-US summits and at ministerial/Commissioner level) were committed to the process 
at the highest levels. MRAs are a tractable example of reducing TBT costs because they are 
based on a treaty, relatively modest in ambition and closely focused on sectors and technical 
competences. One should expect the MRA to be instructive for TTIP and entail some lessons 
to be learned for today’s attempt to lower TBTs across the North Atlantic.  
This CEPS Special Report will analyse the 1998 MRA, the difficulties in the prior negotiations 
and those during the implementation phase, the subsequent and present status of the six 
sectoral annexes and (briefly) the addition of a separate MRA on marine equipment. We draw 
a number of conclusions and policy lessons from this experience. It is good to realise that the 
MRA experience revealed clearly how difficult it is to accomplish the acceptance of all relevant 
aspects of conformity assessment of the trading partner for the mere purpose of testing and 
certifying export goods on the requirements of the importing economy. This modest purpose 
is all that a MRA is supposed to achieve: a MRA neither questions the domestic regulatory 
                                                   
* Jacques Pelkmans is Senior Fellow at CEPS; Anabela Correia de Brito was a research fellow at CEPS at 
the time of writing a study for the OECD Regulatory Committee, from which this CEPS Special Report 
draws (in particular from Annex 3 of the study). The study, entitled “Study on Mutual Recognition 
Agreement”’, will be published later in 2015. The authors thank the OECD for permission to use the 
material as the basis for this report. 
1 There is also a US-EU Veterinary Equivalence Agreement (1998), which will not be discussed in this 
paper. The reader is referred to Tangermann & Josling (2014) for assessment and context.  
2 Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, led by CEOs from both sides. 
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regimes, or their objectives, nor the technical requirements or conformity procedures. There is 
no harmonisation whatsoever. Yet, this regulatory cooperation has succeeded only in a few 
sectors. The ambition in TTIP with respect to TBTs is said to go so much further. It is therefore 
important for all those involved or interested in TTIP to learn the lessons of this early exercise 
in lowering TBT costs.  
2. Preparing MRA negotiations: drivers  
The origins of the MRA go back to the second half of the 1980s when the EU began to deepen 
its internal market with new methods of removing regulatory barriers. The ambition and the 
speed of what was called “EC-1992”3 attracted the attention of the US business and policy 
communities, for fear of a ‘Fortress Europe’ but also expressing a keen interest to maintain or 
improve market access. Such attention was anything but surprising because trade and FDI 
(Foreign Direct Investment) interconnectedness over the North Atlantic had already become 
profound. During the late 1980s, the US began informal talks about a much closer involvement 
of the US when preparing EU decision-making on technical regulation and directly in 
European standardisation4. The menu of options for the US was limited. The US wanted to 
avoid a deterioration of relative market access, with the costs of TBTs dwindling inside the EU 
but not for US exporters. At the same time, harmonisation was not considered as an option. 
Indeed, for both the EU and the US it was basically a new kind of trade policy: regulatory trade 
policy. The crux was to come up with a new ambitious design for trade policy making between 
the two partners. For years, informal talks and tiny accomplishments5 yielded little.6 The 
partners had their own regulatory systems and what was a TBT from the perspective of an 
exporter, was regarded, by the importing partner, as a natural corollary of the duty to protect 
SHEC objectives7 via their regulation and organisation of conformity assessment. From 1986 
onwards, the US and the EU began to publish annual surveys of market access barriers (to one 
another’s markets) with an emphasis on TBTs and SPS (Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures 
about animal and plant health)8. There was a declared willingness to open up their economies 
                                                   
3 What EC-1992 exactly amounted to, how ‘deep’ it was, what type of proposals were enacted and how 
successful the seven-years internal market programme was, can be had from e.g. Pelkmans (2006, 
chapter 5) and Pelkmans (1994). A well-informed political economy account is in Egan (2001). 
4 The famous statement from US Commerce Secretary Mosbacher in 1989 that the US wanted a ‘seat at 
the table’.  
5 For example, in 1990 a MoU was agreed between the Commission (DG Enterprise) and the FDA on 
GMP in pharmaceuticals.  
6 In 1990, US/EU talks of good intent led to the Transatlantic declaration, without firm proposals. 
7 SHEC stands for safety, health, environment and consumer protection. 
8 These annual reports are foreshadowing the issues in the later MRA negotiations. Thus, the 1987 US 
National Trade estimates report on foreign trade barriers (by USTR) expresses considerable concern 
about the 1987 Commission proposals to develop harmonised European standards for telecoms 
equipment (p. 100) and the 1990 Commission report on US trade barriers and unfair trade practices (p. 
18) is quite alarming about the enormous fragmentation of electrical safety requirements for products 
and instalment (some 2700 entities at all levels are said to impose divergent requirements), with lost 
sales thought to be some 15 % of total sales. Telecoms equipment and electrical goods have been the 
economically most important sectors in the MRA negotiations. 
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but without much of a link with, let alone a structural involvement, of regulators or regulatory 
authorities. It is against this background that the emergence of the MRA has to be understood.  
The first drivers of the eventual MRA date back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, which were 
hey-days for trade diplomacy, whether in Geneva for the Uruguay Round,9 or the emergence 
of APEC (on the initiative of Australia) and its intensification in 1993, the conclusion of NAFTA 
and the shaping of the EEA. The EU made it clear by the early 1990s that there was no such 
thing as Fortress Europe in the deeper internal market and that the Commission was mandated 
to negotiate MRAs.10 The US-EU MRA negotiations began in earnest in 199411. Since market 
access to the post-1992 EU was also of concern to other OECD countries, the EU offered to 
negotiate with e.g. Australia and New Zealand, Japan and Canada as well.  
In 1995 the Madrid EU-US summit set up a New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM). US 
business leaders initiated a transatlantic business summit with CEOs from European 
companies to help drive the process of negotiating the MRAs with the EU. Several (rough) 
estimates of cost reduction of the intended MRAs were floated (up to beyond $1.5 billion) and 
time-to-market gains were emphasized by business as well. There is informal evidence12 that 
some business sectors considered the MRAs as an opportunity to also obtain domestic 
regulatory reform in the US in sectors where conformity assessment was seen as unduly heavy, 
slow and costly (in particular, requirements from the FDA and OSHA). With the NTM 
focusing, inter alia, on the MRAs under negotiation, and given the political attention at the 
highest political level, European business leaders also became interested.13 The result was a 
unique initiative of a CEO-led Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)14 which often 
succeeded in formulating common views and positions on technical and sector-specific 
dossiers. The TABD exercised firm and consistent pressure to ensure that the motto ought to 
be ‘one standard, one test, accepted everywhere’, across the North Atlantic, and in fact 
worldwide. Business leaders began to lobby in a concerted fashion in Europe and the US. Some 
lobbying brought concrete results: in the US, for example, they managed to get Congress to 
insert a new clause on MRAs and their facilitation in a revision of pharmaceutical legislation 
in 1997.  
The fact that Trans-Atlantic relations were deepening in the run-up to the 1998 US-EU summit 
in London, creating the Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership,15 and that EU MRA negotiations 
with other OECD partners went smoothly, eventually led to the signalling of the MRAs in 1997 
and the formal conclusion in 1998 during the London US-EU summit.  
                                                   
9 Remember that the TBT Agreement of GATT was refined, among other things, with respect to MRAs.  
10 By a Council of ministers decision of 21 September 1992.  
11 For fascinating and very detailed accounts of the negotiations, see Devereaux, Lawrence & Watkins 
(2006) and Shaffer (2002).  
12 See e.g. Devereaux, Lawrence & Watkins (2006) and Shaffer (2002).  
13 The detailed history of the TABD is found in Green Cowles (1996) and Stokes (1996). See also Quick 
(2008).  
14 The first meeting of TABD was held in Sevilla, just before the 1995 Madrid summit.  
15 See Pelkmans (1998) for detailed analysis and discussion of context. 
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3. MRA treaty and implementation 
3.1 Treaty structure and scope  
Table 1 gives a summary of the MRA. The ‘Framework’ (umbrella) specifies the ‘conditions by 
which each party will accept or recognise results of CAPs 16, produced by the other party’s 
CABs or authorities, in assessing conformity to the importing party’s requirements’ (art. 2). 
This is the purpose of the MRA. Art. 2 clarifies that the objective of such mutual recognition is 
to provide ‘effective market access’. Apart from the pre-able, 11 main provisions are listed in 
the top panel of Table 1. Much of it is procedural, e.g. about what designation precisely is, 
designation procedures, recognition conditions, transition periods for ‘confidence building’, 
rules for suspension and withdrawals (of CABs), some administrative provisions and a general 
proviso on the preservation of US and EU regulatory authority.  
This is followed by six sectoral annexes covering 1) Telecoms equipment; 2) Electro-Magnetic 
Compatibility (EMC); 3) Electrical safety for appliances (and indeed also for telecoms 
equipment); 4) medical devices; 5) Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) and Good 
Laboratory Practices (GLP) for pharmaceutical products; and 6) recreational craft (basically, 
boats for leisure).  
Table 1. Structure of the EU-US MRA  
Framework 
 Pre-amble, emphasizing market access, encouraging harmonisation and equivalent assurance 
 Specifying definitions (e.g. ‘designations’) 
 Specifies conditions by which each party will accept or recognize results of CAPs  
 Transition periods (confidence building) 
 Designation and listing procedures 
 Suspension rules of CABs 
 Idem for withdrawals 
 Monitoring of CABs 
 Exchange of information and contact points 
 Joint committee (plus sectoral ones) 
 Preservation of regulatory authority 
 Suspension of recognition obligations 
Sectoral Annexes 
Telecoms Equipment Specification of laws and requirements; CAPs; 
listing of authorities; designation; 
subcontracting; transitional arrangement: 24 
months. 
Electro-Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) Similar setup as for telecoms equipment. 
Electrical Safety Similar setup as for telecoms equipment; cross-
linkages to telecom and EMC. In EU, complete 
lab assessments under US OSHA procedures (but 
EU can do on-site visits). 
                                                   
16 CAP = conformity assessment procedures ; CABs = conformity assessment bodies 
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Recreational Crafts Specification of laws and requirements; scope 
and coverage; designating authorities; CAPs; 
transition of 18 months; link with EMC and 
electrical safety. 
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) for 
pharmaceutical products 
Pre and post approval inspections; 3 year 
transition period; equivalence determination at 
end of 3 years; nature of recognition of inspection 
reports; transmission of reports; suspension; joint 
sectoral committee; safeguard clause; appendix 
with applicable laws; criteria for equivalence in 
appendix. 
Medical devices Scope (different in EU and US); product coverage 
(quality evaluation systems; product evaluation; 
post-market vigilance reports); transition period: 
3 years; other aspects similar to pharma GMP; 
alert systems. 
Source: Agreement on mutual recognition between the EC and the USA, OJEC, L 31/3 – 31/80 of 4 February 1999.  
3.2 Obligations, general and structural 
Art. 3 of the treaty says that the US (EU) “shall accept or recognise results of specified 
procedures used in assessing conformity to […] provisions of the US (EU), produced by the 
other party’s CABs and/or authorities”. Once the transition periods have been successfully 
completed, such CAPs for this purpose assure conformity ‘equivalent to the assurance offered 
by the receiving party’s own procedures’. Art. 4 lists all the detailed provisions which follow 
(see also Table 1), and adds that the MRA shall not be construed to entail mutual recognition 
of standards or technical regulations. There is also – besides transition periods, suspension of 
listed CABs, withdrawal of listed CABs, monitoring of CABs, suspension of recognition 
obligations – a termination clause.  
The sectoral obligations are far more detailed, with specifications of laws and requirements, 
the enumeration of CAPs and authorities and transition periods. Clauses may sometimes have 
a meaning that is not easily understood from legal texts. Thus, the subcontracting provision 
in telecoms in fact reflected a tradition of US producers to let US CABs subcontract certification 
to Notified Bodies in the EU. In this way they built up durable trusted relationships. Moreover, 
the costs of duplicative testing (which the MRA was meant to reduce or eliminate) were 
already reduced via private alternatives. The same is true for leisure boats. Whereas EMC, 
electrical safety and recreational craft have no appendices and telecoms equipment a minor 
one, the pharma GMP one has five appendices (with the many criteria for equivalence in 
appendix 4) and the one on medical devices two appendices, but in addition a 21 pages table 
specifying hundreds of medical devices types under US legislation. The likely reason for this 
is that, in the EU, medical devices of lower risks classes are under the New Approach with 
SDoC,17 whereas in the US the FDA certifies them all; also, the risk classification of such 
devices differed somewhat between the US and the EU. 
                                                   
17 Self-certification (with the technical file available for authorities) leading to a Suppliers Declaration of 
Conformity. 
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The sectoral obligations and the details seem relatively ‘light’ in the cases of telecoms, EMC 
and recreational craft, heavier for electrical safety (with OSHA lab assessment procedures) and 
most heavy for pharma GMP and medical devices. The latter also has a post-vigilance process 
with reporting, presumably a kind of market surveillance.  
3.3 Transition periods 
The transition periods differ between the sectors due to complexity, the staff and resources 
needed and the differences in requirements between the US and the EU. There are indications 
from the literature that these differences also had to do with concessions to regulators who 
were not so willing. The shortest period foreseen is in recreational craft: 18 months. For 
telecoms, EMC and electrical safety the period is 24 months, but it ought to be noted that, in 
electrical safety, this also included lab assessment under OSHA specifications (however, in the 
EU, done by EU authorities). Electrical safety (for lower voltages) in the EU is under SDoC, 
and regulated by the low voltage Directive (and a host of European standards in its wake, very 
often aligned with global IEC standards) and, eventually, market surveillance. Therefore, lab 
assessments for Low Voltage products – and under specifications presumably different from 
world lab certification standards – do not exist in the EU, and in those days the EU had no 
system of European accreditation yet. For pharma GMP and medical devices, the transition 
period was three years. The success of the tests and experience during that period are a 
prerequisite for the MRA in these sectors to work.  
4. From treaty to implementation 
4.1 Implementation issues 
Dependent on the sector, implementation of the sectoral MRAs has been relatively smooth, 
difficult or a stumbling block. Three sectors proved to be relatively easy - telecoms equipment, 
EMC and recreational craft – although only two Annexes (Telecoms and EMC) are in operation 
today. The first two had been central aspects of the MRA right from the beginning, and 
especially telecoms was rapidly turning into a truly global equipment market, based more and 
more on international standards. In telecoms by June 2001,18 the US had designated 23 CABs, 
and 43 for EMC. The EU had designated a similar number of CABs for EMC. In 1998 the EU 
relaxed its rather strict 1992 telecoms equipment directive towards one where SDoCs would 
be allowed. This self-certification provision meant that the designation of US CABs for 
telecoms equipment to be sold in the EU had become much less important. Recreational craft 
has a simple annex on safety aspects and a short transition period. The need for a MRA in this 
sector arose from the EU’s requirement of certification by a Notified Body; the US Coast Guard, 
the relevant US authority, already permitted to self-certify recreational craft. However, US 
exporters did not exercise much demand for US CABs able to obtain certification (on EU 
requirements); they preferred to continue using pre-existing subcontracting arrangements 
with EU CABs (probably, Notified Bodies) as they had built up long-run relations.19 The 
                                                   
18 See Shaffer, op. cit., p. 14 
19 Shaffer, op. cit., p. 17 notes, only UL applied to be a US CAB under this annex but must have lost 
interest since the Commission Newsletter on MRAs of April 2012 states that no US CABs are designated. 
See trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/may/tradoc_149385.pdf  
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recreational craft annex has not been in operation since 2006 – as a consequence of a revision 
of the EU directive in this area, adding emissions and noise requirements, and thereby moving 
beyond ‘safety’ issues, the focus in the annex, as well as in US legislation and in their 
conformity assessment. 
Matters turned out to be a good deal more difficult in electrical safety. The EU saw the 
electrical safety annex as an imbalanced set-up because US exporters had relatively easy access 
– in terms of compliance costs and time-to-market – to the EU market given the Low Voltage 
directive (with SDoCs), whereas EU exporters faced regulatory reviews and approvals by 
OSHA. But OSHA was unsatisfied by the way the EU filled in the designation procedure: the 
EU accepted, without significant review, applications from the 15 EU Member States, largely 
in languages other than English.20 Once the MRA had been agreed, OSHA insisted to conduct 
on-site reviews – which, for the EU, went against the spirit of the MRA - and began asking a 
fee in October 2000, given the cost burden of the process. In fact, there are signs that there was 
little actual co-operation at all in the joint sectoral committee. Perhaps, with a greater degree 
of willingness and co-operative spirit, the EU CABs could have been capable without any 
effort to submit applications in English!  On the other hand, section VI of the electrical safety 
annex says clearly that “… CABs from the EC shall be designated by the EC authorities …” 
and “OSHA shall rely on the EC designating authorities… for conducting on-site reviews at 
the respective Member States’ CABs”. The upshot was that OSHA rejected a number of 
applications on the basis of languages and incompleteness, typically issues that could have 
been addressed in a properly functioning sectoral committee. This refusal was threatening not 
only this specific sectoral MRA, and indirectly that of telecoms equipment (as electrical safety 
plays a role), but the entire MRA for reasons of ‘imbalance’ and a lack of trust. The designation 
of European CABs by OSHA was of course critical, given the regulatory regime for electrical 
goods in the US. But the acrimony ran much deeper because both the Commission and 
European industry felt strongly that the heavy approval system of OSHA was an 
unnecessarily burdensome and (by virtue of the low risks of these goods) unjustified barrier 
to market access. After all, the EU experience showed that using SDoCs worked well and this 
was usually cheaper whereas time-to-market was much less problematic. Strictly spoken, all 
this is no issue in a MRA, which by definition takes the two regulatory regimes as given, and 
solely focuses on avoiding duplicative conformity assessment. However, the WTO TBT 
Agreement rules that, if TBTs are unnecessarily burdensome and unjustified, they are 
forbidden and ought to be replaced by a justified and less burdensome regulatory regime. For 
EU industry, having – at the time - a structural trade surplus despite the market access barriers, 
even a successful resolution of the designation-of-CABs by OSHA would have been 
considered only as a minor success. Business opportunities would be much greater if self-
certification of low-voltage electrical goods 21 would be allowed by OSHA, just as it was in the 
EU for many years. Apart from a few quotes in Shaffer (op. cit.) and Devereaux et al. (op. cit.), 
suggesting that this deeper issue of distinct regulatory regimes for electrical goods was a bone 
of contention even when not formally part of the MRA, there is no evidence that attempts were 
undertaken to better appreciate each other’s regulatory regimes, as a first step to come to 
possible solutions, including the eventual recognition of SDoCs from companies operating in 
the EU under the Low Voltage directive and related (European, and indeed often world [IEC]) 
                                                   
20 Shaffer, op. cit. There were 11 EU official languages in the late 1990s.  
21 Which, for OSHA, includes electronic equipment as well. 
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standards. All that emerges from the literature is the repeated remarks from OSHA officials 
about the Commission’s failure to understand that this issue is one of occupational health and 
safety – that is, for US workers – and not ‘the’ market in general without distinction between 
workers and consumers, as was customary in the EU given low risks. However, many years 
later, when US-EU regulatory cooperation was deepened by establishing the Transatlantic 
Economic Council in 2007, the issue was addressed in detail, as summarised in section 5. 
On medical devices, the story is little different, only more complicated. Regulatory culture, 
views on risks and sensitivities about the balance of costs and benefits of (how far) bringing 
risks down for patients all differed between the EU and the US. The FDA was stricter in its 
risk classification of some medical devices and it systematically practiced (centralised) pre-
market approval via designated CABs as well as factory inspections, also abroad. Largely in 
contrast, the EU approach to medical devices was mainly based on the New Approach with 
self-certification, except for high-risk devices (such as pace makers) for which 3d party 
certification by Notified Bodies was required. But none of this required pre-market approval. 
The details of these inspections, data requirements and some technical aspects of clinical tests, 
etc. also differed between the US and the EU, indeed, as it turned out, even differed sometimes 
between EU Notified Bodies.  
In pharmaceuticals the problems were probably even greater. Although the agreement is on 
GMP, the definitions of GMP of the US and the EU are not even harmonised in the annex: in Art. 
1.3, both definitions have been included, with a clause stating that the parties have agreed to 
‘revisit’ these concepts. The core of the annex is the recognition of the ‘equivalence of the 
regulatory systems of the parties’ (Art, 2, called – in the wording of this article itself – the 
‘cornerstone of this annex’). The three years transition ‘aimed’ to arrive at this recognition 
which seems more like an ‘endeavour’ than a fully-fledged MRA. The FDA felt that not only 
did it have to review multiple EU directives and related EU documents but also each Member 
State’s implementing legislation, regulatory structures and practices. Before recognising an EU 
country’s ‘equivalence’, the FDA required EU countries to engage their officials in joint 
training and joint inspections.22 All this suggests that the underlying idea of mutual 
recognition of assuming that other countries also care about the health and safety of their 
citizens and patients, as a starting point to set up a MRA, was firmly lacking. In addition, in 
both the cases of medical devices and pharmaceuticals, the agreed confidence building 
activities were not completed – and were not able to resolve key technical challenges to 
implementation of the annexes. At the same time, one has to recognise that the EU internal 
market for medicines was still seriously incomplete. Although the US does not enjoy a 
perfectly single market either, it does have a single, independent regulator. When the MRA 
was being negotiated, the EMA just initiated its work (1995). There was no way it could be 
regarded, at first, as a natural and experienced counterpart of the FDA, with sufficient 
competences. Moreover, although considerable harmonisation of medicines regulation had 
taken place, Member States’ regulators still maintained major influence and significant 
residual powers with respect to marketing authorisations. For instance, in GMP – the subject 
of the US-EU MRA in pharma – common EU rules were only laid down in 2001 and further 
                                                   
22 Shaffer, op. cit., p. 20, quotes a FDA official that the FDA has ‘refused to compromise its mission of 
protecting health for balance of trade purposes’ whilst, at the same time, claiming that the FDA received 
insufficient resources for the additional and costly burden of implementing the MRA. In fairness, the 
FDA faced, to some extent, a similar problem across 50 US states and Puerto Rico.  
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guidelines in 2003. In addition, the pricing of medicines in the EU is regarded as a national 
competence, for social reasons (e.g. national re-imbursement systems sometimes leaving 
prices free, yet in other EU countries, prices are purposefully kept very low). However, the 
upshot of that two-tier governance was still a fragmented internal market at the time - we shall 
see that major improvements have been witnessed since those days. It is therefore not entirely 
unreasonable to argue that, perhaps, the EU was not ready internally to live up to the 
requirements of an effective MRA in medicines, in turn rendering the FDA even more hesitant. 
Of course, one can nevertheless maintain that the FDA was unusually difficult, because MRAs 
on pharmaceuticals with countries such as Canada, Japan and Switzerland were negotiated, 
too, and initial difficulties were eventually overcome to some degree.  
4.2 The sectoral MRAs after five years 
By 2003, three sectoral annexes were operational: telecoms equipment, operational since 14 
December 2000; EMC, operational since 14 December 2000; and recreational craft, operational 
from 1 June 2000 to 2006. Since EMC is of importance for both electrical goods and telecoms 
equipment, this helped the telecoms sector to some extent, but it meant little for electrical 
goods.  
Electrical safety had not gone into operation due to the tension between the Commission and 
OSHA. After OSHA’s rejection of CABs designated by EU countries, the Commission felt that 
letter and spirit of the MRA were violated. In May 2002, assertions circulated in the press23 
that the EU was likely to suspend the electrical annex or withdraw from it. In June 2002 
discussions were held on the pharma annex as well. The press24 suggested that US experts felt 
the Commission was ambiguous about the annex because it feared that GMPs of individual 
EU countries would appear to be inconsistent. The two sides ‘agreed to disagree’. Hence, the 
electrical annex was never made operational (and suspended 25 but not terminated) and the 
pharma one has never come into operation, but regulatory co-operation and information 
exchange exist (the annex has neither been suspended nor terminated). Medical devices had 
seen an extra transitional period of 2 years, but in 2003 the entire annex became defunct. 
Formally it is not in operation and no CABs are designated. Precisely in 2003 the Commission 
undertook its regular review of the three medical devices directives from the 1990s26. In 
showing that a number of deficiencies had to be addressed, it may be seen as echoing some of 
the apparent concerns of the FDA: the Commission noted that both the designation and 
monitoring of the Notified Bodies left much to be desired, more clarity had to be ensured about 
clinical evaluation requirements, post-market surveillance had to be improved and issues 
around ‘design review’ had to be solved as well. This eventually led to a slight upgrading of 
these directives as proposed in 2005 27 and agreed shortly thereafter (as Dir. 2007/47). But of 
course the 2003 intentions for improvements fell far short of what would have been required 
for a process of regulatory convergence with the US. Thus, the MRA in medical devices 
remained a dead letter. The Commission’s 2012 MRA newsletter states that regulatory co-
                                                   
23 As quoted by Shaffer. 
24 Idem 
25 On 21 Jan. 2003 ; see OJEC L 23 of 28 Jan 2003, p. 24 
26 See COM (2003) 386 of 2 July 2003 on medical devices 
27 See COM (2005) 681 of 2 July 2005 
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operation on medical devices between the two sides exists and the MRA annex is ‘regarded as 
superseded’ by this co-operation. The benefits of a MRA in medical devices are foregone but 
perhaps ‘this’ regulatory co-operation (after all, the FDA can and does designate/recognise 
foreign labs and GMP but on its own, not in a ‘mutual’ context) might nevertheless reduce the 
actual costs of accessing the US market for EU exporters. This will be briefly highlighted in 
section 5. For medicines, the MRA was dead already by 2001 but the EU gradually deepened 
its pharma regulation and procedures (also linked to EMA’s work) while intensifying 
voluntary regulatory cooperation in the ICH (EU, US, Japan). Also, EMA did become a better 
recognised partner of the FDA, exemplified by a 2007 bilateral agreement on common market 
authorisation of orphan drugs, so as to ensure the large Transatlantic market in order to help 
recuperate the R & D expense.  
4.3 Adding marine equipment 
In April 2004 the MRA on marine equipment was formally agreed. It is a separate agreement. 
It is also different from ‘traditional’ MRAs in that there is far-reaching underlying 
harmonisation.28 This harmonisation has not been negotiated between the US and EU but was 
already accomplished in a world forum, the International Maritime Organisation. Therefore, 
the MRA was relatively easy to conclude. Given alignment of both sides with IMO rules, 
designated products which comply with EU requirements (with certification by Notified 
Bodies) under the marine equipment directive will be accepted for sale in the US without any 
additional testing or certification, and vice versa for products conforming with US 
requirements (certified by the US Coast Guard). Whereas the US Coast Guard is in charge on 
the US side, the autonomous EU agency EMSA29 is in charge in the EU. Some 49 types of 
marine equipment are covered.  
5. Regulatory dynamics emanating from the MRA 
5.1 The new EU MRA policy 
The mismatch between many years of efforts and the actual outcome in 2003 led the EU to 
revise its MRA stance in 2004. This was not only due to the EU-US case. There were other 
disappointments with MRAs with other countries. For example, with Canada, medical devices 
turned out to be a problem due to a desire of Canada to have control over CABs in the EU; 
with Japan the pharma GMP annex is operational since 2004 but its coverage in terms of 
pharmaceutical products is partial, and the electrical one is formally operational but no CABs 
seem to have been designated. On the other hand, the five sectoral MRAs with Australia and 
New Zealand work well, although the amount of trade under them appears to be rather 
modest. 
In a low-key document30 the European Commission reviewed its MRA drive since the early 
1990s and changed its priorities. The document first reviews the experience with MRAs. The 
                                                   
28 What the Commission calls an ‘enhanced’ MRA, that is, with alignment of rules.  
29 European Maritime Safety Agency.  
30 A Commission Staff Working Paper, not a Commission ‘communication’; see SEC(2004) 1072 of 25 
August 2004, Priorities for bilateral/ regional trade related activities in the field of MRAs for industrial 
products and related technical dialogue 
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Commission notes that “[c]onfidence building becomes even more difficult where the 
technical requirements and overall regulatory approach of the two parties differ 
substantially”. “Our experience with the US and Canada MRAs has shown that, despite 
considerable investment on our side, good will is difficult to obtain in cases where there are 
substantial differences in the regulatory requirements /approach.” Where MRAs have been 
delayed or implementation was difficult, “… the market has found other ways of achieving 
the same result in a more efficient way”.31 The last point is of great importance: apparently, 
subcontracting (under retained responsibility of the CAB of the other party) is more efficient 
and quicker, not least because in this way well-established exporters can maintain a 
relationship with CABs on both sides, familiar with their products. The Commission explicitly 
considers two alternatives of MRAs: one is direct recognition of foreign CABs [but without, as 
in MRAs, conceding the right of such recognition to authorities of the other party], based on 
accreditation, in turn supported by international quality networks like ILAC and IAF 32; 
another is about ‘voluntary schemes’ such as energy labels33 promoting energy efficiency. The 
overall conclusion of the Commission paper is that i) ‘traditional’ MRAs without underlying 
‘alignment’ are difficult to both negotiate and implement and that it is “not worth pursuing 
new negotiations on this type of MRA”; and ii) ‘enhanced” MRAs, with such alignment or 
even harmonisation, offer the best prospects of implementation and trade facilitation. On 
bilateral MRAs, the Commission holds that “no more ‘traditional’ MRAs should be concluded 
with the US” and “no more sectors should be added” but efforts should concentrate on the 
three MRAs from 1998 which are operational.34 For the MRAs with Australia and New 
Zealand, it is noted that they work well but trade impact is small and the expectation of some 
degree of regulatory convergence has not been borne out.  
5.2 Do MRAs and regulatory reform interact? 
In international regulatory co-operation, often the hope or expectation is expressed that, once 
authorities/regulators are confronted with regulatory solutions or systems employed in other 
countries, there will be, sooner or later, a ‘learning effect’. This learning could simply consist 
                                                   
31 All these quotes from p. 4. 
32 ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation) has an arrangement with 85 signatories 
from 70 countries. It covers accredited testing and calibration laboratories since 2000 and accredited 
inspection bodies since 2012. Its laboratories and bodies conform with ISO/IEC 17011 (and related ILAC 
guidance documents), ISO/IEC 17025 and several other ISO 17000-series accreditation standards. There 
is a strict verification procedure and peer review. See www.ilac.org/ilacarrangement.html and 
Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015). IAF (the International Accreditation Forum) is specialised on 
accrediting (e.g. quality) management systems. The IAF Multilateral Recognition Agreement ensures 
recognition of equivalence of accreditation of other IAF member bodies to its own. IAF covers 63 
countries with one body except for the US (with four) as well as six regional accreditation groups 
(including the EA, the European cooperation for Accreditation). See www.iaf.nu. See for further 
explanation on the actual or possible relation of these accreditation networks with MRAs in a worldwide 
context, see Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015).  
33 The Commission notes it had concluded a MRA with the EPA in the US on ‘Energy Star’ labelling. 
34 Added is a telling comment: “Other ‘enhanced’ type MRAs should be pursued only where… Agencies 
responsible for implementation are interested (our experience … has been that political agreements 
cannot guarantee their implementation… when implementation is an independent agency’s 
responsibility)”. 
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of ‘familiarisation’, hence, lead to a more relaxed attitude when recognizing practices or 
institutions in other countries (like CABs) or, in a stronger form, the adoption of similar 
approaches via domestic regulatory reform. MRAs are based on the legal and political premise 
that domestic regulation, its objectives and institutions remain unaffected. MRAs deal strictly 
and only with conformity assessment in export country A on the product requirements as well 
as CAPs of importing country B, and vice versa - neither objectives, nor technical requirements 
nor CAPs are at issue. Indeed, the US-EU MRA is clear about this; moreover, art. 15 of the 
agreement confirms the ‘preservation of regulatory authority’ of the parties - its formulation 
is strict and refers to a wide scope. But such a starting point need not imply that nothing will 
actually change over time.  
One can discern two types of regulatory reform linked to MRAs, and derived from the US-EU 
case: regulatory reform caused by the sectoral MRAs; and domestic reforms, independent 
from MRAs, but affecting the working of MRAs or even rendering them superfluous as 
alternatives (may) take over. As to the first category, Shaffer (op. cit., pp. 41-42) holds that the 
US-EU MRAs prompted some regulatory reform but that it was primarily the US which felt 
compelled to do so. The principal reason would be that inside the EU there was much 
experience of such processes of comparing national regulatory regimes whereas the US was 
unaccustomed to exposure, let alone to requests to adapt its practices. Three such changes are 
mentioned by Shaffer: (a) the US has adopted some international standards that mirror EU 
ones, (b) on two occasions US Agencies have begun to allow private CABs to test and certify 
(the FCC began to allow this for telecoms equipment in 1998; the FDA began, also in 1998, a 
programme for private testing and certification for most medical devices), inspired by the EU 
approach and insisted on by US business;35 (c) coordination and oversight of private 
laboratories under a new NIST 36 programme (in 1999), hoping for greater confidence with 
regulatory officials. One may also argue that the spread of MRAs to other OECD countries at 
the time would help the EU New Approach flexibilities to become more acceptable elsewhere, 
which, in turn, would increase the (business and public) pressure on the US to accept further 
regulatory reform.37 Attractive as it might sound, the suggestion seems to be a little too easy 
because, as noted, Canada and Japan were most prudent on e.g. medical devices and electrical 
safety, and only Australia and New Zealand (already used to mutual recognition under the 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement) embraced the EU model in five sectoral 
MRAs, without however going for regulatory convergence. Alternatively, such a gradual 
reform process might emerge but with much greater time lags given the unquestioned priority 
of domestic regulators to serve the relevant SHEC objectives at all times.  
The second type of regulatory reform consists of more or less autonomous domestic reforms 
which subsequently turn out to affect the MRAs and/or their operation. Of course, during the 
last two decades the issue of regulatory burdens and red tape has been prominent in all OECD 
countries, if not worldwide. In some cases, reforms reducing red tape or other ‘unnecessary’ 
burdens were directly relevant for the operation of the MRA for business. Linked to the MRAs 
(ex post) are EU reforms such as the revision of the telecoms equipment directive in 1998, 
allowing SDoCs, as well as the EU reform for EMC in 2004 (amending the 1989 directive) also 
                                                   
35 Although US firms can now rely on private testing bodies, many still use free FDA inspections instead.  
36 The US National Institute for Standards and Technology, a body affiliated with the US Dept of 
Commerce.  
37 One advocate of this idea is Kalypso Nicolaidis (2000). 
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no longer requiring third party certification and hence relying on SDoCs. With SDoCs, one 
way of the two-way MRA is no longer needed. However, this also happened the other way 
around: in recreational craft, it is the EU which requires third party certification and the US 
accepts SDoCs. In Canada, for example, third party certification for EMC was abolished in 
2003 and because that happened the year after in the EU as well, the MRA in EMC has become 
pointless. Whether deeper or wider regulatory reform on the basis of imitation of the 
regulatory regime of the partner has taken place is doubtful38, except perhaps for medical 
devices. MRAs may well be the famous tail which cannot easily be expected to move the much 
bigger dog of domestic regulation.  
In medical devices, however, after having initiated a prudent regulatory reform process in 
2003 (see above), the EU undertook a more fundamental review of the regulatory regime for 
medical devices from 2008 onwards. The proposals in 2012 39 responded to a raft of weaknesses 
and the debates even became somewhat acrimonious once the PIP (breast implants) scandal 
broke out and repeated problems with artificial hips occurred. Proposals included 
amendments and clarification of the legislation, strengthen the designation and supervision of 
the Notified Bodies 40, strengthening the position of Notified Bodies vis a vis manufacturers 
(e.g. unannounced inspections), clarifying the obligations of producers and importers, 
expanding a European database, increase the traceability throughout the value-chain [using a 
Unique Device Identifier (UDI), a tool also discussed worldwide] and e.g. greater coordination 
between national authorities. In the subsequent debate, the EP rapporteur Ms. Roth-Behrendt 
and a large group of MEPs (as well as BEUC) advocated to move even closer to the US model 
by establishing a centralised EU pre-market approval model with a separate Agency for 
medical devices. A compromise solution of a special committee linked to EMA seemed to be 
agreeable in the spring of 2014, but the EU legislator has still not enacted the legislation. The 
point however is that what was thought – by EU negotiators - to be an overly tough US regime 
in the mid-1990s, was actually approximated to a considerable degree by the EU in recent 
years. Moreover, the slow-moving process of regulatory convergence in the Global 
Harmonisation Task Force has become more relevant with the new International Medical 
Device Regulators Forum, focused on global standards (such as ISO 13485), its pursuit of a 
worldwide UDI and e.g. a harmonised format for product registration submission. Altogether, 
the initial road of the MRA would now be less difficult but at the same time, this MRA 
approach seems to have been overtaken by a global consensus of leading countries to find 
global solutions. In this process, TTIP might well solidify the new global cooperation.  
As far as medicines are concerned, one observes a gradual but steady improvement of the 
various regulatory aspects of the EU internal market since the early 1990s, also after the MRA 
in pharmaceuticals had failed in 2001. We already noted that common EU rules for GMP were 
enacted in 2001, with further guidelines in 2003. Nowadays, the EU has arrived at a system 
retaining the Member States competences (e.g. on re-imbursements and to some extent on 
medicines’ safety) but fully coordinated with EMA oversight. Some experts hold that, today, 
                                                   
38 See also Quick (2008) for a broader discussion of regulatory cooperation between the US and the EU 
and its inability of generating regulatory reform until 2008 inclusive.  
39 See COM (2012) 540 of 26 September 2012, Safe, effective and innovative medical devices and in-vitro 
diagnostic medical devices (etc.)  
40 Going somewhat beyond what is obligatory in Reg. 765/2008 for all New Approach products, 
including European accreditation 
14  PELKMANS & CORREIA DE BRITO 
 
the EU has a more robust and quality- assured evaluation and drug approval system than the 
US. For instance, centralised applications for marketing approval are assessed by both a 
rapporteur and a co-rapporteur and draft assessments are shared with the whole network of 
national authorities. Also, various forms of regulatory cooperation have been developed 
outside the MRA, helped greatly by the fact that both the US and the EU have experienced 
medicinal Agencies by now. The FDA and EMA and/or the Commission and/or the Member 
States have cooperated in e.g. ‘active pharmaceutical ingredients manufacturing’ (such as 
harmonise the inspections, etc.), in change requests, paediatric medicines and 
pharmacovigilance (alert systems and common formats).  
Getting around the MRA via regulatory alignment? 
The notion that a MRA will only work well once regulatory systems have or develop a 
significant degree of convergence, is very different from the initial understanding of MRAs. 
The original idea behind a MRA is purely one of avoiding duplicative testing/certification, 
taking the regulatory regimes, including conformity assessment and inspections, of both 
parties as given. Indeed, a MRA is intrinsically a modest arrangement. However, the history 
of the US-EU MRA shows that there is some interaction between the MRA and domestic 
regulation or CAPs, as noted. But there is also evidence that MRAs make both regulators and 
other stakeholders realise even more that the core of the TBTs better be addressed as well, even 
if carefully and gradually, and preferably in cooperative (i.e. not treaty-driven) ways. In other 
words, regulatory alignment achieved by cooperative mechanisms might sometimes work 
better than a MRA treaty. We provide two striking examples of such attempts: a successful 
attempt in medicines 41 and a failure (so far) in electrical goods. 
In medicines, the vexed problem of inspections of factories - seemingly hopeless in the first 
years of the MRA – has eventually been solved cooperatively by agreeing to have comparable 
rules and standards of inspection via PIC/S. Today, all Member States’ agencies (but three) 
have joined PIC/S, a total of 28 agencies in 25 EU countries. The US became a member of PIC/S 
in 2011 after the compulsory assessment and the FDA has been actively participating ever 
since in all PIC/S meetings as well as in training and other activities. All PIC/S members now 
apply the audit check introduced by Canada. Experts and pharma companies underline that 
the observations and findings of EU and US inspectors are the same nowadays. Furthermore, 
the ICH global cooperation between the US, EU and Japan had become operationally more 
important precisely when the MRA was about to fail. Nowadays there are some 50 ICH 
Guidance documents (common approaches for determining efficacy, quality and safety of 
medicines, the most prominent one being ICH doc. Q 7) and this voluntary setting appears 
effective in reducing regulatory diversity. One specific accomplishment in saving 
(unnecessary) costs is the CTD (Common Technical Document): with this CTD, only one single 
file for the approval process is required with all the required data, and it is accepted in the US, 
the EU and Japan. One might regard this as a partial substitute of the MRA.  
In electrical goods, the EU frustration about the failure of the MRA to lower market access 
costs did not go away. When the Transatlantic Economic Council was set up by US and EU 
                                                   
41 One can argue perhaps that the recent development in medical devices, in the International Medical 
Devices Regulators Forum (based on a global standard, a worldwide UDI and a harmonised format of 
product registration submission) promise to become effective routes towards regulatory convergence 
as well.  
TRANSATLANTIC MRAS: LESSONS FOR TTIP? | 15 
 
political leaders in 2007, a commitment was made to address this issue via regulatory 
cooperation. In 2008 the Commission submitted a proposal to OSHA to accept SDoCs for 
electrical goods falling under the Low Voltage directive. In 2010, a rather elaborate analysis 
was published by OSHA 42 of the Commission proposal to accept SDoCs, instead of 3rd party 
certification solely by NRTLs43, for low-risk electrical goods. This lengthy document is 
interesting as it sheds light on what it takes to achieve effective regulatory cooperation with 
such agencies. What is positive in the approach is the maturity and analytical nature of the 
exchange between OSHA and the Commission, as well as other EU stakeholders, in sharp 
contrast with the acrimony of the late 1990s. Reducing the TBT that the Commission perceives 
– i.e. heavy and restricted 3rd party certification instead of SDoCs – for market access of 
electrical goods to the US market cannot be ‘negotiated away’: it can only be the result of an 
analysis of whether domestic regulatory obligations in the law (here the US OSH Act) are not 
negatively affected or undermined by allowing SDoCs of companies exporting from Europe. 
OSHA rejected the request from the EU. It based its decision (after two years of seeking a 
profound understanding of how the EU system works and what its health and safety records 
are) on two complementary assessments: one statistical (is there “a direct correlation between 
the method of protection and low rates of illness or injury”?) and one qualitative (assessing 
“the operation, attributes and elements of the [EU] system to determine whether it is likely to 
provide a high level of protection”). 
This Special Report cannot do full justice to the reasoning and analysis of the OSHA Notice. 
But a few points can be made. First, in two ways the OSHA approach is more ambitious than 
is customary in the EU with respect to the Low Voltage directive: (a) OSHA insists on ‘hard’ 
statistical proof and found that the statistical data submitted falls short (in several ways) of 
providing substantive empirical evidence in favour of SDoCs; (b) OSHA must guarantee a 
‘high level of worker protection’ (similar to what the EU treaty objective is) but it recalls US 
case law holding that OSHA is allowed to “deviate only modestly from the stringency required 
by section 6 (b) (5) for health standards” 44, and then adds (on its own account) “which must 
eliminate significant risk [ as in the EU, the authors] or reduce that risk to the maximum extent 
feasible”. It is the last part of the sentence that would seem to disregard a cost-benefit approach 
or a sense of proportionality. It is well-known in the economics of regulation that the marginal 
costs of avoiding risks to the maximum extent possible can be very steep indeed, with only 
minimum extra benefits obtained. Of course, this is a societal choice given the ‘right to 
regulate’ of every country. However, it is good to understand that it is plainly impossible to 
impose such rules for too many goods and services as it would become unpayable. There is 
always a risk remaining anyway and cost-benefit perspectives help one to realise whether it is 
worthwhile to engage in risk reduction ‘to the maximum extent feasible’ or better spend these 
additional resources for other purposes. Since Low Voltage electrical goods tend to be low-
risk goods, the question is therefore whether much, if anything, is gained by imposing very 
costly regulatory regimes including conformity assessment by NRTLs or UL instead of SDoCs. 
Hence, what for OSHA is prudent risk regulation coupled to strict conformity assessment plus 
                                                   
42 Notice: Nationally Recognised Testing Laboratories: Suppliers Declaration of Conformity, OSHA, 
Washington DC, December 17, 2010 ; Federal Register Number 2010-31695 (ID : OSHA-2008-0032-0099). 
43 OSHA 3rd party certification must be conducted by Nationally Recognised Testing Laboratories, 
legally spoken, but in actual practice or due to nearly 30 US States’ laws, by UL.  
44 In the US, here, standards mean ‘regulatory requirements’ 
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regular inspections, amounts (for the EU) to a TBT ‘unnecessarily’ hindering market access for 
EU exporters. Add to this the fact that, on the whole, EU electrical goods are competitive, with 
a structural trade surplus with the US for decades even with the higher access costs, and the 
contours of a profound disagreement in bilateral regulatory trade policy are sketched.  
The OSHA Notice goes deep into the statistical evidence offered by EU stakeholders in order 
to substantiate the good EU record in electrical safety of these goods and the Agency finds the 
empirical evidence wanting on a number of plausible grounds. It also recalls samples of two 
subsectors in the EU where compliance had turned out to be bad, and used it against the EU 
(absent other reliable statistical information for all subsectors). Although compliance failures 
often consisted of (inappropriate) paperwork, not technical failures, a non-trivial share also 
showed technical failures. Relevant injuries and accidents statistics were compared and no 
clear evidence in favour of the EU system was detected. This led Europeans to complain that 
these statistics are either weak or incapable of identifying why such accidents happen: is it 
equipment failures or conduct or for other reasons?  
The point here is that the light EU regime (because electrical goods are seen as low risk) does 
not invite heavy and systematic investment on accident statistics and across-the-board 
statistics from market surveillance ; indeed, there is no culture of permanent (re)justification 
based on evidence that regulation for such low risk goods works well. This means that the EU 
is at a disadvantage vis-á-vis a (US) regulator with huge resources and the power to impose 
3rd party conformity assessment (also yielding better statistics). Subsequently, OSHA assesses 
the SDoC as a ‘reactive’ system. Although the Agency has the tendency to reason in favour of 
the eventual rejection, the weaknesses of the SDoCs, the problems in EU markets arising from 
a lack of annual inspections and the limitations of EU Member States’ market surveillance are 
nevertheless revealed systematically.  
A number of partial alternatives to the OSHA-NRTL system are discussed and eventually 
rejected. Finally 45, OSHA becomes a little defensive when it points out that, even when it were 
to grant SDoCs as a proof of compliance, it would need to massively invest in market 
surveillance (it suggests no less than $ 360 million annually) 46 and acquire additional powers 
e.g. for recalls. The Notice shows very well what it takes to overcome the more stubborn 
(perceived or actual) TBTs in TTIP. This does not mean that alignment or regulatory 
convergence is impossible but, rather, that one has to invest in the case for equivalence based 
on hard arguments and empirical evidence and one might, perhaps on both sides, have to be 
prepared to introduce selected reforms to render alignment acceptable for risk regulators. This 
is not impossible for electrical goods. A few years after the OSHA rejection, a review of the 
functioning of its NRTL’s system has been initiated due to a major dissatisfaction. This might 
still lead, perhaps in modest degrees, to partial regulatory alignment.  
                                                   
45 It also rebuts the notion that the OSHA system is a TBT whereas it holds that the EU is less ‘free’ in 
market access than it asserts.  
46 Here one ought to realise that the OSHA regime is only covering electrical goods for professional use ; 
the massive consumer market in the US is not covered at all (unlike in the EU). The huge sum for market 
surveillance only for professionally used electrical goods therefore looks suspiciously like a convenient 
excuse. 
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6. Lessons or implications for TTIP 
We draw two straightforward conclusions from this MRA experience and offer four lessons 
for TTIP.  
The first conclusion is that the MRA of 1998 had failed for one half and was (is) successful for 
the other half; however, in trade flow terms, the MRA coverage was around 20 % of the 1995 
total for five sectors (without the recreational craft one), with the EU experiencing a negative 
trade balance.47 On the whole, a disappointing outcome and a far cry from the expectations of 
business and top decision makers in 1998. Second, the EU’s attempt to ‘balance’ the MRA 
package in the negotiations – so typical for trade negotiators - did not work out. The concern 
of EU trade negotiators emerged from the narrowing down of 12 sectors, when the MRA talks 
began in earnest in 1994, to telecoms equipment and EMC only one year later. Sectors such as 
electrical goods, medical devices and medicines showed EU trade surpluses for many years 
and their inclusion in the MRA package would restore ‘balance’. The US showed little 
enthusiasm for this balancing approach but eventually gave in. But precisely in the sectors 
brought in by the EU in 1995, problems – in particular by what the EU saw as a lack of 
flexibility on the part of the relevant independent US regulators - eventually led to a failure 
due to regulatory diversity in implementation. It confirms that ‘regulatory trade policy’ cannot 
be successfully conducted like classic trade diplomacy: domestic regulators must be satisfied 
during and after the negotiations that their pursuit of SHEC objectives will not be watered 
down in any way. Regulators should therefore (also) be in charge of regulatory trade policy, 
in TTIP and in other such negotiations.  
From the experience of the 1998 US-EU MRA and related regulatory debates, we draw four 
lessons for mutual recognition of conformity assessment or, more ambitiously, attempts of 
regulatory convergence in TTIP. 
i. MRAs are not about regulatory change, but if regulatory cleavages are too wide, MRAs can only work 
under such restrictive conditions, that partners may regard them as a denial of its very purpose. 
MRAs reflect a conscious choice of governments not to engage in regulatory change, and solely 
focus on reducing transaction costs of market access in case of regulated products. Both (or 
more) countries do this not unilaterally but jointly. Lowering transaction costs usually consists 
of reducing or eliminating duplicative controls/certification and tests, and this, in turn, can be 
achieved when both governments accept (subject to a safeguard clause only) that the 
government of the exporting country has set up a system which is competent in assuring 
conformity with the importing country’s requirements. If this acceptance is lacking and 
country A insists on direct control for product x or own inspections of factories, the MRA risks 
degenerating into a heavy structure for processes that can also be executed without a MRA, 
namely unilaterally. In the run-up to TTIP, it was often heard that the failures of the US-EU 
MRA in three sectors was probably due to the difficulty in implementing the MRA across 
jurisdictions and agencies that may act (too ?) independently given their mandates and not in 
the spirit of the MRA. This may well have been true (and we quote informal evidence 
supporting this), but closer scrutiny shows that this is not the whole truth. As noted above, at 
                                                   
47 In Devereaux et. al, op. cit., p. 314, 1995 trade flows are provided. On the EU side telecoms equipment 
exports to the US amounted to around 12 % of the total flows for the 5 sectors; on the US side, its 
telecoms exports amount to 23 % of total flows.  
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least in medicines and medical devices, the EU regimes at the time left something to be desired. 
With hindsight, the improvement of EU regulation as well as the tightening of conformity 
assessment and/or pre-market approval and GMP constitute important signals that the US 
regulators had justified substantive concerns as well. But it is equally important to recognise 
that much has changed in two decades. For example, GMP inspections no longer differ 
between the US and EU. Nowadays, more robust internal market regimes and some regulatory 
rapprochement should make it much easier to pursue effective regulatory cooperation 
(including or not, a MRA). One implication of this awareness is that a (new) MRA or such rules 
incorporated in TTIP would free resources for authorities to focus more inspection attention 
on higher-risk countries like India and China.  
ii. MRAs are about (recognised) 3rd party certification and inspections, but there are incentives to opt 
for alternatives in the market, some of which have meanwhile developed international credibility. 
MRAs are feasible in markets which are less heavily regulated, but ironically, in these cases 
they are also less needed because alternatives to MRAs (in particular, SDoCs) might serve as 
a lower cost and swift solution. When SDoCs are not permitted, other alternatives may 
nevertheless be used by market players. Thus, in particular large US (EU) exporters with a 
steady customer base (or as part of a value chain) in the EU (US) have a great interest in durable 
relationships with CABs. The costs of getting to know their products and the associated risks 
are lower and communication faster and easier when CABs regularly test their product range 
or new variants. It might also facilitate the planning of testing which may shorten time-to-
market. In other words, for large and regular exporters there are costs of switching CABs and 
therefore they will favour subcontracting via ‘their’ CAB. Since the designated CABs typically 
have subsidiaries in many countries, and surely in the US and the EU, the actual working of 
the MRA is different from what was originally envisaged. The conventional operation of the 
MRA will then be significant only for new entrants or occasional exporters or in cases of 
overload. New entrants may well be SMEs, so for them and possibly the emergence of ‘new’ 
competitive rivalry, the MRA would still fulfil a useful function. One can extend this point 
further: if the MRA would be renegotiated, there would be a strong case for involving or 
recognising the international quality networks of CABs and accreditation bodies, thereby 
greatly facilitating the arrangements for business.  
iii. MRAs in heavily regulated markets can only be expected to function properly once an advanced 
degree of regulatory alignment has taken place.  
Medicines and high-risk medical devices are heavily regulated and that seems justified. 
Between the US and the EU, however, high-risk medical devices were excluded in the MRA. 
For low-risk medical devices, the FDA was simply unwilling to alter its approach (and control) 
– whilst the EU and its member states were probably not ‘ready’ given the then state of EU 
regulation and conformity assessment by Notified Bodies – whereas for pharmaceutical 
products ‘only’ GMP was at issue, be it both with pre- and post-approvals, but even that was 
at first an ‘acceptance’ bridge too far.48 At the same time, cautious attempts were initiated at 
the global level to achieve greater regulatory cooperation for pharma and medical devices. 
Meanwhile, they have grown into cooperative efforts of regulatory alignment and effectively 
                                                   
48 Shaffer reports a conspicuous difference between the US and Canada in this respect. Canada was 
capable of evaluating the 15 regulatory systems of EU countries within the transition period, and this 
period was shorter than in the US case. Note 221, p. 40. 
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so. Interestingly, this cooperation is amongst regulators, not trade negotiators. The experience 
suggests not so much that MRAs are impossible (e.g. pharma works with Canada for a few 
years now, and for the EU-Israel MRA since 2013), but that MRAs in such sectors are not 
suitable unless all stakeholders (including regulators) agree beforehand what it will take and 
that sufficient time is foreseen to evaluate and – above all – build trust. Confidence-building 
measures must be given time. But once regulatory alignment is initiated at a global level, this 
is much to be preferred. TTIP could of course attempt to reinforce such global cooperative 
efforts. It confirms an insightful inference from the OECD (2013) that governments should 
think in terms of a spectrum of forms of regulatory cooperation of which an MRA is one among 
many options. And although many such cooperative efforts are legally ‘soft’, some of them 
may nonetheless be effective in reducing the costs of TBTs.  
iv. Once one attempts to propose modest ‘reforms’ of conformity assessment methods of US independent 
regulators, so as to reduce the costs of TBTs, and thereby get around the MRA, one should be 
prepared for a fully-fledged impact assessment, with the hard empirical evidence that it requires. 
In the EU, and to some extent in circles of US business too, it is widely held that the 
implementation of the MRAs in sectors under the responsibility of independent US agencies 
was carried out in an overly rigid manner, without acknowledging the idea and spirit of 
mutual recognition. This tended to minimise the benefits of the MRA or caused failure. The 
costs of their CAPs and other requirements were regarded as unnecessarily high, certainly in 
comparison with the more widespread practice of relying on SDoCs in Europe. Curiously, 
there is no reference in the (scarce) literature about the early stages of the MRA to cost-benefit 
analysis, qualitative or quantitative. This is peculiar because US independent federal agencies 
routinely conduct cost-benefit analysis of their proposals, indeed, are often under the duty to 
do so. One reason for not doing so in the context of a MRA might have been that regulatory 
regimes of both parties are taken as given and are not to be questioned. The EU proposal in 
2008 to persuade OSHA to accept SDoCs constitutes an attempt to get around the MRA and 
go for a mutual acceptance approach (here, of SDoCs) via a modest degree of regulatory 
alignment (in one sector). What happened was that OSHA undertook, given its remit and 
duties to provide extensive empirical evidence for such a change, a kind of impact assessment, 
with an emphasis on extensive consultation and statistical evidence about accidents and 
injuries, compared to those in the US. The EU, with ‘light’ regulation in electrical goods, was 
not fully prepared for that. The two-year process of exchange of arguments, regulatory 
approaches and empirical evidence, culminating in the reasoned rejection by OSHA of the EU 
request, reveals quite well what it takes to accomplish alignment of CAPs of an independent 
US regulator: ‘passing’ a kind of impact assessment, with hard empirical evidence, and a 
preparedness on both sides to initiate modest reforms in conformity assessment, as a result of 
a – preferably joint – analysis. This inference directly relates to the chapter on horizontal 
regulatory cooperation in TTIP.  
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